Despite an increase in attention to "geography" in civil war research, local dynamics in violence remains poorly understood. To address this gap, we analyze disaggregated violent event data for the North Caucasus of Russia from the start of the second Chechen war, August 1999, to July 2010. We employ a diffusion perspective to examine the spread of the conflict from its Chechen nucleus and we identify the tit-for-tat nature of the conflict between the rebels and the military/police forces as especially significant in understanding the conflict's dynamics and spread to neighboring republics. A spacetime analysis shows that violence is concentrated at short temporal intervals and geographic distances. As the insurgents in the violence have changed from a dominantly nationalist to Islamist, the geography of the war has become more diffuse across the Muslim republics of the region, rendering the Russian counter-insurgency efforts more challenging.
Introduction
Despite the welcome recent attention to the "geography" embedded in civil wars that is evident in dozens of studies published in political science over the past decade, the range of such geographic analysis is still quite constrained. While there was little discussion or consideration of geographic factors in quantitative international relations during the Cold War (notable exceptions were studies of the effects of territorial disputes and shared borders such as Siverson and Starr, 1991) , the study of the spatiotemporal dynamics of disaggregated civil war events has not yet grasped the essential nature of the geographic perspective and remains constrained by a geometric mindset (countries as locations, not as places, and as data-points, not as contexts) that characterized Cold War-era studies. While the new disaggregation approach to civil war study has yielded a spate of data, the methods typically used to analyze this information have remained firmly within the toolbox of non-spatial approaches and frequently do not take full advantage of the locational information embedded in the data "Geography", as quaintly known in the field of international relations, is usually a perspective that considers distance from key locations and between key actors as explanatory variables in a model; it can also be a summary physiographic measure like "terrain" such as the ratio of territory above a certain height or that area covered by forest, as evident in the well-cited study by Fearon and Laitin (2003) . As Hart (1997, 7) said in relation to his study of the 1916-21 Irish rebellion, "to understand the origins and outcomes of the revolution, and the sources of its violence…we must understand its geography." But what McColl (1969, 614) wrote about rebellions more than 40 years ago is still accurate: "Virtually every aspect of the revolutionary process has undergone intense study. There remains one element, however, that has not received adequate attention. This is the geographic aspect in the evolution ... of revolutionary movement." This paper is organized in three related analytical parts. First, we contribute to the expanding body of research on the disaggregated study of violence in civil wars through a focus on the multiple connected conflicts in the North Caucasus of Russia that erupted after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. We examine the 11 years of localized violence after the beginning of the second Chechen war in 1999 by a diffusion analysis of violent events enacted by the rebels (a disparate set of actors) and by Russian military and police. Second, as a result of the splintering of rebellion along community, religious, and ideological lines that have been well-documented by political commentators (Economist, 2011) , a geographic analysis of the rebel groups' actions yields both the mechanisms of conflict diffusion and evidence of governmental responses. Third, we hone methods of interaction derived from crime studies between the actors (rebels and military/police) to check if these interactions demonstrate consistent and predictable pattern of violence diffusions that suggest expectations of the future landscapes of conflict. Our emphasis is on the micro-geography of violence, an approach that is made feasible by the identification of its 14,613 precise.
The regional context of post-Soviet violence in the North Caucasus of Russia
The past two decades of North Caucasian conflicts can be divided into five phases. The first phase (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) were marked by a growing identity mobilization amongst the diverse peoples of the region, most notably, by the Chechens, one of four populations deported by Stalin in 1944 from the region to Central Asia (they were later repatriated in the 1950s). While the Russian government under Boris Yeltsin accepted limited autonomy for other Russian regions (e.g. Tatarstan), it refused to accept Chechen independence demands. The second phase corresponds to the first war, 1994-1996, that effectively allowed the Chechen rebel leadership to control the republic's internal affairs whilst still remaining in the Russian Federation. A weak federal center and an ineffective military campaign by Russian forces permitted the Chechen rebels to achieve most of their demands. As insurgent attacks continued despite federal control of Grozny and other key centers in the piedmont and steppes in the central and northern part of Chechnya, the Russian strategy of "Kadyrovization" (named after the Presidency of the Chief Mufti, Akhmad Kadyrov) developed. With the killing of much of the Chechen rebel leadership, both moderate and radical, and switching of former rebels to the Kadyrov camp (Ramzan Kadyrov succeeded his father who was assassinated in 2004), the war in the republic entered the most recent phase, of guerrilla attacks and a much lower level of violence after 2005 (estimates of the total killed in both wars are generally over 100,000). Kramer (2004-05, 12) described the conflict as a stalemate since rebels "continued to inflict enough damage on Russian soldiers to erode their morale and create the appearance of an endless, unwinnable war", but in 2006, the Russian government claimed that the war was won and the rebels routed (Baev 2006) . However, as the war was winding down in Chechnya after 2004, the conflict intensified in the region as a whole (Markedonov, 2010) . By 2009, significantly more violent events were occurring in Ingushetia and Dagestan, the republics adjoining Chechnya to the west and to the east (Mendelson, Malarkey and Moore 2010; Howard, 2011; Kuchins, Malarkey, Markedonov, 2011) . In a region where the biggest concern of ordinary people is economic insecurity and where corruption is rife and barely concealed (Gerber and Mendelson 2009) 
Revolutionary movements and geographic modeling
For almost a decade, disaggregated studies of civil strife have detailed abstract theories about violence at the individual level with many following the individual rational choice model that is criticized by Kaufmann (2004) . These theorists then fit their models at the aggregate level, thus generating a mismatch between theory and analysis (Cederman and Gleditsch 2009 ) and between the micro-and macro-scales of theory and empirics (Kalyvas 2008) .
Unlike research on civil wars that premises its micro-foundational assumptions on rational choices by governments, rebels and civilians, our approach adopts a meso-scale perspective and an aggregate data analysis. We return to the writings of the geographer Robert McColl (1967 McColl ( , 1969 who closely examined the writings of Mao Tse-tung and other Asian revolutionaries. While McColl's main interest was the identification and mapping of revolutionary strongholds and growth for purposes of counterinsurrectional policies, his theories of rebel territorial strategy guide our models of the diffusion of violence in the North Caucasus.
McColl's reading of the revolutionaries' documents and memoirs led him to conclude that knowledge of the local social, ethnic and physical geographies is crucial to advancement of their movements and successful military campaigns. For revolutionaries who are attempting to take control of the state apparatus, his summary (1969, 616 ) that "(s)uch a process requires intimate adjustment to the realities of both the physical and human geography of the country" can most effectively be verified with geolocated data and spatial analytical tools.
For McColl, rebels begin their territorial drive by fixing a set of initial, small bases mostly in the countryside, and then try to expand from them. Similar patterns of insurgent expansion in other civil wars have been noted by Kalyvas (2008) , by Lyall (2009) for the North Caucasus and by Henriksen (1976) for former Portuguese colonies of Africa. These initial footholds, based on deep knowledge of local socio-economic and ethnic geographies of a region in turmoil, are typically associated with the home province of rebel leaders, and benefit from a network of friends, relatives and neighbors.
McColl (1967) believed that a set of principles that guided insurgent strategies. The most attractive locales for revolutionary activity (where mobilization activities would have their highest payoff) are in areas with previous unrest, where political stability at the local level is lacking. Choosing rebel base locations should also be predicated on both protective (self-sufficient and located in a favorable terrain) and attack considerations, accessible to key political targets: "(b)ases cannot simply be located where they would be safe due to topography or distance from the enemy" (Mao Tsetung, Selected Works 1954 quoted in McColl 1967 . Once established, bases should not be abandoned except under the most dire circumstances.
Though not referencing the McColl work, Kalyvas (2006 Kalyvas ( , 2008 ) also adopted a territorial perspective in a predictive model that scales control on a five-point spectrum (from 1= incumbent control to 5 = insurgent control), and anticipated that conflict would be most intense in the middle zones. Evidence from Greece and Vietnam lend support to the approach and allowed Kalyvas (2008, 417) to conclude that while disaggregation is essential for understanding civil war dynamics, a focus on territorial control is needed for modeling violence. Simple mapping of violence suggests the validity of the territorial perspective but it does not take advantage of the suite of methods developed specifically for analysis of geographic data.
The post-1999 conflict in the North Caucasus differs from the McColl model that assumes a growing and successful insurgency across four stages. In the first stage, "mobile war" is a result of insurgent weakness who move continually to avoid defeat.
If a movement is sustainable, the key (second) stage of establishing a rebel base can be achieved. Expanding from these bases, insurgents have the core support to enter the stage of "guerrilla war" in the third phase. If this war is prosecuted successfully, a parallel state (insurgent state) can be formed, completing the "territorial imperative" (last stage). The Chechen rebels had achieved this "insurgent state" status by 1996.
Because the rebel movements ebbed and flowed rather than grew (as in the McColl model), we expect the geography of North Caucasus violence to show more complicated trends -from an "insurgent state" status back to "mobile war". We set out two propositions below that steer our expectations.
Though geography and related disciplines have a long tradition of using the diffusion paradigm to study important social and political topics, such as crime (Cohen and Tita, 1999) , disease (Cliff et al, 1981) , democracy (O'Loughlin et al, 1998) , legislative innovations (Gray, 1973) , and housing deterioration (Odland and Barff, 1982) , its application to the study of conflict is haphazard. During the Cold War and immediate post-Cold War years, the spread of violence across borders (Most and Starr, 1980 , O'Loughlin 1986 , Kirby and Ward, 1987 To test this proposition, we separate the point-specific data into rebel and military/police violence. (In the region, local and federal police coordinate activities with the various Russian military forces and we combine them into one category). We present measures of geographic concentration or deconcentration for the geolocated events over time to clarify the level of spatial fragmentation and diffusion of the violence. Our expectation is that patterns of violence should reflect the reverse of the changes in rebel and military strategies as described in McColl (1967 McColl ( , 1969 ) for a resurgent rebel movement.
Proposition 2:
The factors that undergird rebel strategy in McColl's review of revolutionary movements are visible in the spatial and temporal trends in the decade-long conflict. By examining the interaction between rebel and police/military events in a space-time framework, the spread of the violence from its Chechen core will be evident in predictable diffusion trends.
The violence data for this study are a subset of the larger database of 16,613 violent events for the North Caucasus between August 1999 and July 2010. The larger dataset includes four kinds of events -with three sets of actors -the Russian military, federal and local police, and rebel forces. The fourth set is a mass arrests category that recognizes the widespread use of this tactic by Russian forces in the region but because the tactic is all-encompassing, most of the those arrested are civilians and thus, hard to classify as one side or the other in the conflict. In this paper, we focus on rebel, military, and police events only and combine military and police into one category, a total of 14,613 events. Event data were coded from media reports available via Lexis-Nexis for political violent events only (criminal violence was omitted). We do not use casualty figures or other measures of severity since we cannot rely on the accuracy of these numbers due to the highly-inconsistent claims by both sides in the conflict. most events were geolocated to the nearest town or village, for some, the best location was a district (rayon) for 1,783 events or republic for 2,001 events. In these circumstances, we allocated events to the respective centroids. For detailed analyses that required a higher spatial resolution, rayon and/or republic geocoded events were excluded.
To assess the overall trends in violence, we plot the 25 week running average (about To measure temporal dependence (events in one period related to events in previous periods), we calculated the autocorrelation (ACF) and partial autocorrelation functions (PACF) for weekly rebel and military/police violence for lags up to twenty weeks. After a lag of one week, the ACF plot drops off dramatically, though remains statistically significant out to twenty weeks (graphs not shown). The ACF/PACF analyses show military/police events much more time-autocorrelated than rebel events.
To visualize the distribution of violence over space and time, we aggregate violence to a set of 25km x 25km grid cells (292 in total, shown on Figures 2 and 7) .
By mapping the grid cell by the year when the monthly maximum violence occurred, the diffusion of violence from Chechnya to the adjoining ethnic republics over the past decade is evident (Figure 2) . Simultaneously, the cumulative plots of violence by type 
Tit-for-tat violence in the North Caucasus: Rebel and military/police interactions
The tit-for-tat nature of irregular warfare is well documented in studies, from the Irish war of independence 1919 -1921 (Hart 1999 to the Greek civil war (Kalyvas 2006) and to a quasi-experimental study of rebel actions in response to Russian shelling of Chechen villages (Lyall 2009). Like other works of this genre, the emphasis is on the congruence of spatial (locations) and temporal (dates) actions. If the action-reaction mode of conflict is dominant in the region, one would expect a significant concentration of subsequent events within a short distance and time span (proposition two). As well documented in diverse contexts of civil war dynamics, violence tends to be unevenly concentrated across urban and rural locations, and has been modeled using the population, physical geographic, transportation and military features of the locations (Dixon 2007; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hart, 1999; Kalyvas 2006 Kalyvas , 2007 Kramer 2004-05; 2012) . Our perspective here identifies the dynamics of conflict irrespective of the characteristics of the places.
We explicitly explore the interactive nature of rebel and military/police actions in the North Caucasus by using daily records to consider the distances between rebel and subsequent military/police violence. For each rebel event, the median distance to all military/police events during the subsequent week is calculated (averaged for days with multiple rebel events). Both scholarly work and participant accounts of civil wars indicate that most military/police actions are in response to some prior incident; many events in our data base note this connection. We limit the temporal dimension by setting a conservative upper limit of one week, though some events, especially those that are highly destructive of property or high in casualties, are likely to have repercussions lasting many months or more. We also explore the relationship between rebel and military/police violence by calculating space-time probabilities of the interactions between events (Table 1) . To calculate these probabilities, we create a grid-week (25 km grid cells) space-time unit to aggregate violent events; 1 indicates violence occurred anywhere in the grid cell during the given week, and 0 otherwise. The conditional probabilities are then calculated for time lags up to 8 weeks and space lags up to 3 neighbors away (using the queen contiguity for the geographic grids). For instance, for one or more rebel events in a given grid-week, Table 1a show the probability of at least one military/police event occurring in the same grid-week (t0, nb0), in the following grid week (t1, nb0), in any of the neighboring grid cells in the same week (t0, nb1), etc.
Overall, the probabilities in Table 1 show that violence is more persistent over time than across the space. For both rebel (36.8%) and military/police violence (31.6%) distributions, even after 8 weeks, there remains a good chance of opposing group violence occurring (first column of table 1). By contrast, the probabilities decline rapidly over distance as the number of neighbors away from the original violence cell increases, despite the fact that total grid cells increase from 8, to 16, to 24 for nonboundary grid cells given a distance of 1, 2, or 3 neighbors, respectively (comparisons across the rows of table 1). The probability values for each spatial lag remain almost constant across the time bands.
Comparing the probabilities in Table 1a and 1b shows a consistently higher probability of military/police violence following rebel violence for the same grid cell, as well as for second and third order neighbors. Only for first order neighbors is the probability of rebel violence following military/police violence slightly greater, possibly direct retaliation in the specific community for military/police killings (Howard, 2011) . These comparisons reflect, in part, the overall greater numbers of military/police actions (2.44% non-zero occurrence for all 167,024 grid-weeks) compared to rebel violence (2.15% for all grid-weeks). Because civil wars are highly localized in certain key urban centers, near important targets or by geographicallydifferential support for rebels, they take on the character of 'hot spots' of violence. In these locales, violence is repetitive, recurrent and entrenched. Our data show that one should expect an overall 4 in 10 chance of a military/police action after a rebel event for each of the following 8 weeks in the same grid and about a 1 in 3 chance of a rebel response. However, these general expectations are strongly differentiated across the region. 
Space-time interaction dependence in North Caucasus violence
After presenting descriptive ratios and cartographic displays of the conditional probabilities, in this section, we explicitly incorporate the temporal dimension into our spatial analysis to statistically assess the level of space-time interactions for rebel and military/police violence in the North Caucasus. The method we employ was initially used to detect space-time dependence in leukemia cases (Knox 1964) , and more recently in residential burglary in US cities (Johnson et al. 2007) Though the counts for each bin are of interest, we focus on the space-time bins that exhibit more violence than expected by chance. Rather than expecting the event pair counts to follow a Poisson distribution with its unrealistic assumption of independent violent event pairs, we opt to use Monte Carlo simulation that does not require such assumptions. This method retains the original event locations and randomly permutes the observed event dates to construct a simulated set of violent events where violence cannot occur in any place (which would be unrealistic given the highly uneven patterns of human settlement in the region), but is instead constrained to where we know violence occurs. We construct 99 such permutations to yield a total distribution of 100 after adding in the counts from the observed data. An empirical p-value is then calculated for each space-time bin based on the rank position of the observed data within this distribution (North, Curtis, and Sham 2002) .
We applied the method to both rebel and military/police events, splitting the study time period at the end of July 2006 coinciding with a marked decline in Russian military and police activity (see Figure 1) . Figure 8 shows results using a uniform temporal bin of 4 days to a maximum of 80 days and two spatial bins, one of width 2 km to a maximum of 30 km and the other of width 10 km to a maximum of 200 km. Each figure indicates the number of violent events, n, used to generate the event pairs. Given the precise distance calculations required for this analysis, only events geocoded to specific towns were included (11,472 events of the 14,613 total military/police and rebel events). Grozny at the height of the war.
Since much of the violence is concentrated in Grozny, it is sometimes possible to detect a 'Grozny-effect' looking at the smaller 2 km bin sizes. For instance, there is a noticeable and significant increase in rebel violence clustering between 14 kms and 16 kms ( Figure 8c ). This is due to the higher than expected violent event pairs for Grozny and the town of Argun to the east. 
Discussion and Conclusions
Like previous studies of recent guerrilla wars in Iraq (Townsley, Johnson and Ratcliffe, 2008) and Afghanistan (Benini and Moulton, 2004) , we have shown that the interaction between government and rebel forces is predictable and is concentrated over short time and spatial dimensions. The best predictor of the future locations of violence in a civil war is the past pattern as conflict takes on a strongly localized character. Our spatial analysis of this diffusion quantifies a pattern that is widely discussed in media accounts of the North Caucasus violence, but difficult to visualize without the extensive database compiled here. As expected from McColl's (1969) model, rebel strongholds tend to remain 'in situ' and in a period of rebel ascendancy, the conflict spreads from these bases towards governmental centers and strategic targets. In a phase of rebel retrenchment, the strategy for rebels is both to continue to launch attacks from these bases and to disperse and diffuse to other locations from which to continue the fighting.
In the North Caucasian case, the rebel defeat and retreat from Grozny in 2000 and the increased federal control (with local allies) of Chechnya by 2006 pushed the rebels into increasingly isolated positions, in the mountains and in adjoining republics. At the same time, the insurgency took on a (partly) different character, one that appealed to the establishment of a Muslim "Emirate" across the whole North Caucasus. Our maps and graphs, our identification of spatial dependence and our space-time analysis of the probability of recurring violence in response to that of the other side, tracks these developments effectively and clearly shows the diffusion of the violence from its Grozny core over the past decade.
Schutte and Weidmann (2011) have suggested, based on quite preliminary modeling with coarse data for civil wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda, Burundi and Kosovo that these 1990s conflicts took on the character of both expansion (they call it escalation) and relocation diffusion. Based on Monte Carlo simulation, they conclude that these wars are primarily of the expansion type. In this type of diffusion, the locations change little but the agents of diffusion (in our case, rebel and military/police) increase in number over time. The North Caucasus wars since 1999 illustrate both types of diffusion, using Gould's (1969) is why this fragmented pattern has developed and is intensifying. What accounts for the fact that one community has produced a mobilized anti-Russian population while adjoining and similar communities remain quiescent? In these differences lie a real aim of disaggregated study of civil war, one that must take the local context of such activity much more seriously.
